


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16 September 1965




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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY



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GROUP 1
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AND DECLASSIFICATION

State Dept. review completed

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
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


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6. Netherlands-Indonesia: Dutch willing to expand economic relations. (Page 10)
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*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)


The Political Situation in South Vietnam: In an apparent effort to forestall renewed restiveness among ethnic tribesmen in the central highlands, Premier Ky yesterday received an oath of allegiance from 400 former members of the tribal autonomy movement FULRO in a ceremony held in Ban Me Thuot. Although the ceremony was hailed as the end of the rebellion, tribal dissatisfaction and Vietnamese distrust of the tribesmen are likely to persist. An estimated 1,200-1,500 FULRO members remain outside government control, at least one third of whom are armed.

Fights have been reported between Vietnamese rangers, regular troops, and tribal paramilitary forces garrisoned in the provincial capital of Pleiku, a possible further reflection of ethnic tensions existing in the highlands area. The city has been declared off limits to US military personnel since 11 September because of the internal Vietnamese military feuding.

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: The major ground operation being conducted near the district town of Ben Cat in Binh Duong Province by Vietnamese government and allied troops has entered its fourth day without significant opposition from large Viet Cong forces believed to be in the area. No US or Vietnamese combat casualties have been reported thus far. Two New Zealanders, however, were killed on 14 September when their jeep ran over a Viet Cong land mine.

Elsewhere, troops of the US 101st Airborne Brigade reportedly completed an operation 15 miles north of An Khe in central Binh Dinh Province, capturing 33

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Viet Cong and detaining an additional 28 suspects. No US casualties were reported. The US First Cavalry (Airmobile) Division has opened its command post in An Khe, while the main body of the division continues to debark at Qui Nhon.

Twelve B-52 Strato Fortresses struck a Viet Cong training area located approximately 50 miles south of Saigon last night. Two ARVN battalions were landed from river assault craft to exploit the air strike. No information on progress of the ground followup operation has been reported.

Communist Political Developments: North Vietnamese spokesmen are expressing concern over recent bomb damage to the dam and dike system in North Vietnam. In a formal statement at a special news conference on 15 September the US was accused of trying to "create floods, drought, and famine" by destroying water conservation facilities built at "immense cost."

Only one of the two facilities mentioned in the statement has been hit--the Ban Thach Dam was part of an important hydroelectric installation struck in late August. The other, a dam in Ha Tay Province, lies outside the limits of armed reconnaissance flights a few miles southwest of Hanoi, and has not been a primary target. Hanoi claims it was hit on 9, 10, and 12 September.

Although the North Vietnamese are exaggerating the damage done to the water system, the protest probably reflects concern over US intentions. Like recent propaganda over alleged use of poison gas in South Vietnam, these charges also appear designed to arouse world opinion over the effects of US military action on the civilian population of the DRV.

A delegation of Vietnamese Liberation Front officials is touring Eastern European capitals in an apparent effort to secure further Communist support

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for the Viet Cong position on the war in South Vietnam. The group arrived in Sofia on 3 September and received a Bulgarian pledge of support which included an offer of volunteers "when necessary." The group next stopped in Budapest on 14 September for a ten-day visit. Their itinerary in Hungary includes meetings with officials and a tour of the provinces.

Vietnamese residents in Cambodia have become "confused and somewhat discouraged" about the progress of the war in South Vietnam, [REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED] The disillusionment reportedly stems from recent Vietnamese Communist propaganda which, while still expressing confidence in the Viet Cong's ultimate victory, has also stressed the long, arduous course the war must yet follow before victory is achieved. This is the first evidence that the conflict inherent in the two themes has begun to have an adverse effect on those sympathetic to the Vietnamese Communist cause. [REDACTED]

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
INDIA-PAKISTAN Order of Battle

() Line of confrontation

← Thrust movement

⤿ Link-up

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India-Pakistan: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

The fighting is continuing, but at a slightly reduced rate, with diplomatic initiatives coming more to the fore.

An Indian defense spokesman asserted yesterday that Indian forces had penetrated seven miles into Pakistani territory in the Lahore sector and that Indian artillery can now hit Lahore airport. The deepest Pakistani penetration, the spokesman said, was in the Chhamb area, where Pakistani forces are 10 to 14 miles inside Indian Kashmir. He added that the Pakistanis appear to have placed too much reliance on tanks, which the Indians have been able to knock out.

India also claims to have seized control of a railroad line running between Sialkot and Pasrur, 30 miles to the southeast. This railroad is an important link in Pakistan's defense system. Pakistan, however, maintains that the fighting at both Sialkot and Lahore remains at a stalemate.

U Thant yesterday sent a new appeal to both sides calling for a cease-fire to take effect this morning. Following the cease-fire Thant would have attempted to work out further provisions acceptable to both India and Pakistan. India promptly accepted this proposal, conditional on similar acceptance by the Pakistani side; however, Ayub rejected the offer in a letter to the Secretary General last night. Indian reaction to this development was a foreign ministry statement that the war would continue with "unabated vigor."

At a press conference yesterday, Ayub publicly appealed to President Johnson to take a direct hand in settling the dispute. Ayub referred to the achievement of the de facto cease-fire in the Rann of Kutch crisis as a model for the present situation and stated that Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite within three months could be negotiated.

The US Embassy in Karachi comments that the Pakistanis would now probably accept a cease-fire that fell

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short of its standard demand for a withdrawal of all forces from Kashmir and a subsequent plebiscite since the primary Pakistani objective, which was to create a situation which could force international consideration of the Kashmir question, has long since been accomplished. [Ambassador McConaughy believes that the exact terms of an armistice could be quickly arranged so far as Pakistan was concerned if the Pakistanis felt a reasonable assurance that their basic aims regarding a Kashmir settlement and long-term security vis-a-vis India would be advanced. Such assurances have not been spelled out but probably would prove unacceptable to India at this time.]

[The ambassador believes that the Pakistani relationship with Communist China does not inhibit Pakistani flexibility on Kashmir, but notes that Pakistani terms regarding a settlement of the dispute will appear quite reasonable if the Pakistanis do well militarily, but will seem far less reasonable if the Indians appear to be winning in the field.]

[In a conversation with Ambassador McConaughy, the Iranian foreign minister reported that Ayub, in his discussions with the Turks and Iranians on 14-15 September, appeared flexible, forthcoming, and highly desirous of reaching a fuller understanding with the US: Ayub reportedly very largely agreed with Turkish and Iranian representations that the fighting must be stopped before Pakistan's military potential was wholly dissipated.]

[The Pakistani president also reportedly proposed an Iranian mission to Moscow, London and Washington to make clear the Pakistani position in the dispute. This mission, which has yet to receive the approval of the Shah, would attempt to set the stage for direct US-Pakistani talks "ranging across the entire board." Ayub reportedly would like full face-to-face discussions and complete restoration of traditional US-Pakistani relations.]

[Both Ayub and Foreign Minister Bhutto reportedly were highly gratified by Secretary Rusk's statement on
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Kashmir yesterday and by the US role in keeping the conflict from spreading to East Pakistan. [redacted]

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[redacted] Ayub said that Pakistan was "prepared if necessary to be a satellite of the US" as long as this did not involve becoming a satellite of India in collaboration with the US.]

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One aspect of what appears to be the present Pakistani concern is the POL situation. Representatives of Esso in Karachi told the embassy on 14 September that Pakistani refinery stocks were low and that a crippling shortage was in prospect if a tanker did not arrive in two or three days. Indian and Norwegian tanker crews have been reluctant to come into Karachi during the present hostilities. Pakistani refinery consumption has evidently been cut from a normal 7,000 tons a day to 5,500 tons. The embassy estimates that Pakistani POL stocks are only adequate for four to five days starting 14 September, although several tankers are due in Karachi between 18 and 21 September.

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A Turkish foreign ministry official present at the talks between Turkish Premier Urguplu and Pakistani Air Marshal Asghar Khan told the US Embassy in Ankara that Urguplu categorically stated that Turkey could not provide Pakistan with planes, pilots, and spare parts, but did assure Asghur Khan that as much assistance as possible from purely Turkish resources would be given. However, an official of the Indian foreign ministry has indicated that India believes that Turkey is willing to provide Pakistan with spare parts for F-86s, radar devices, bazookas, mortars, and shells. The Indians also claim that small arms have already been flown into Pakistan from Turkey, and that a considerable quantity of small arms and ammunition, including bazookas, anti-aircraft guns, and anti-tank ammunition is on the way by ship.

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Netherlands-Indonesia: The Dutch have demonstrated their willingness to expand economic relations with Indonesia.

The communiqué issued after recent talks in Djakarta indicated that some agreement will be reached to bypass the question of compensation for nationalized Dutch property valued at about \$800 million.

In the meantime the Netherlands Government is likely to continue providing Indonesia with export credit guarantees. It will also permit Dutch firms to contract economic agreements with the Indonesians, such as the recent \$166-million deal for construction of Fokker aircraft.

On a related issue affecting relations with Indonesia, the Dutch probably will not insist on raising at the coming UN General Assembly session the implementation of the 1962 West Irian accord which provides for a plebiscite in the Indonesian-administered territory by 1969.

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*Dominican Republic: The provisional government installed on 3 September has now survived almost two weeks but the outlook is one of instability and uncertainty.

As a first step to reduce tension President Garcia Godoy managed, with the support of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), to bring about General Wessin's departure from the country. However, the problem of peacefully reincorporating the rebel zone into the normal structure of the country remains pre-eminent. A start has been made by the dismantling of some rebel defenses and the return of as many as 1,000 unarmed rebel militants to their homes in the provinces. This return has been accomplished under the terms of the general amnesty with only a few incidents.

The returning rebels have chosen the guise of conquering heroes--a tactic which could easily provoke clashes with wary army and police units. With an unknown number of cached arms at their disposal, some of the more extremist elements may seek to carry out their intention to begin terrorism and guerrilla warfare campaigns once the IAPF leaves.

Arms collection, reintegration of rebel military personnel, and reinstitution of law and order in the downtown sector of Santo Domingo remain to be accomplished.

Although the provisional government appears to have been accepted by the general public, it lacks a broad political base and ultimately must depend on the Dominican military. Garcia Godoy will be under pressure to bring about the departure of the IAPF--which would leave him dependent upon the military. Many of the military are deeply suspicious and fearful of the president's intentions.

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Minister, who has been a supporter of the government, is upset over Hector Garcia Godoy's actions. Rivera has reportedly stated that unless what he feels is the growing influence of the Left is curbed, he will be forced to take drastic action.

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